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WORKER RESPONSES TO OCCUPATIONAL RISK OF CANCER
James C. Robinson* Abstract-Toxicological data from the Registry of Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances and worker exposure data from the National Occupational Health Survey are used to construct an occupational cancer risk index. This objective cancer risk measure is strongly correlated with subjective workerassessed measures of exposure to health hazards in the 1978-80 Young Men's and Young Women's National Longitudinal Surveys. Workers exposed to occupational health hazards, as measured both by the objective risk index and the subjective risk perceptions, are more likely to quit their jobs than are otherwise comparable workers not exposed to hazards. They also pursue voice strategies, as measured by willingness to vote in favor of union representation.
Public policy in the area of occupational safety and health has developed under the implicit assumption that the self-interested actions of individual workers, labor unions, and managers in an unregulated environment are not adequate to minimize the incidence of work-related health problems, especially chronic health effects such as cancer. In contrast to this rather pessimistic view of the labor market as a source of incentives for hazard reduction, a considerable empirical literature has developed documenting the extent to which workers recognize hazards on the job and respond to those perceptions. Both "exit" and "voice" worker strategies have been reported, using data on quit intentions, quits, prounion attitudes, and the extent of union representation. These empirical studies have been limited by the types of data available on working conditions, however, which to date have consisted largely of injury rather than illness rates. As such, these studies are not directly relevant for answering the important question as to the extent to which labor market incentives can act as substitutes for and complements to direct governmental regulation of occupational exposures to chronic health hazards. Workers who come to believe that their jobs pose significantly greater risks than initially conjectured will, in Viscusi's model, be more likely to quit their jobs than otherwise comparable workers whose hazard perceptions do not evolve in this manner. Duncan and Stafford (1980) Hills (1985) and Robinson (1988) find that nonunion workers in unsafe jobs report a greater willingness to vote in favor of union representation than comparable workers in safe jobs.
These models can be summarized in the form of in Pedersen, Young, and Sundin (1983) . workers not so exposed. These effects are statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level using a onetailed test. The effects of the other variables in the exit regressions are consistent with those reported in other studies of worker quits (e.g., Viscusi, 1979; Freeman, 1980) . Unionized workers, those with higher wage rates, and those with more years of employment tenure ari.
significantly less likely to quit between subsequent interviews than are nonunion workers, those with lower earnings, and those with less tenure. Workers in jobs offering few promotion possibilities are more likely to quit than are workers with good prospects for promotion. Black workers and older workers are less likely to quit than are white and younger workers, other things equal.
For both objective and subjective measures of occupational health hazards, workers at greater risk are more likely than otherwise comparable workers at less risk to report prounion attitudes. According to the figures in the fourth column of table 3, a four standard 
Conclusion
The results presented in this paper indicate that workers recognize at least some of the cancer risks they face on the job. This finding is especially interesting since it is based on data gathered in the late 1970s before the main period of growth in "right-to-know" and related policy strategies designed to increase worker hazard awareness. The 1980s have witnessed an explosion of policy initiatives at the local, state, and federal levels that grant workers improved access to hazard information, and particularly to information on occupational carcinogens (Ashford and Caldart, 1985) .
More recent data might show an even stronger correlation between objective and subjective measures of haz- In section I we consider a specific Nash Equilibrium (NE) bidding model due to Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox, Smith and Walker (1988) that clearly illustrates the risk-sensitivity of the theoretical predictions. In section II we provide independent evidence of the risk attitudes of experimental subjects in a test for risk attitudes developed by Harrison (1986a) . This evidence allows us to construct an explicit prior probability density function over the coefficient of (constant relative) risk attitudes employed in the specific bidding model of section I. In section III we reconsider the evidence from the First Price (FP) experiments reported in Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) and Cox, Smith and Walker (1983a, 1983b) .
I. A Specific Bidding Model
Cox, Roberson and Smith (1982) , hereafter CRS, present a model based on a power function utility specification for agent i:
Ui(y) y=
